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an Academic Freedom Privilege
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1972, Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
19641 so that it prohibited discrimination by universities and col-
leges.2 In so doing, Congress recognized that discrimination within
the university3 setting had become a societal problem with no ade-
quate remedy.4 Previously, the only remedy available to the victim
of university discrimination was an action under sections 1981, 1983,
or 1985 of Title 42 of the United States Code.5 However, such actions
inadequately dealt with private universities. 6 The amending of Title
VII was an attempt to stem discriminatory practices which had flour-
ished within private universities. 7 The natural consequence of the
amendment was an increase in discrimination claims by disgruntled
faculty members who had been refused employment or tenure.8
The cases involving denial of tenure launched a legal debate over
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982). Section 2000e-2 provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin ....
Id. at § 2000e-2(a).
2. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat.
103 (1972).
3. The term "university," as used in this Note, will include colleges and other ac-
ademic institutions.
4. See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2139 ("Despite the commitment of Congress to the goal of
equal employment opportunity... the machinery created by the Civil Rights Act of
1964 is not adequate.").
5. Recent Development, A Qualifed Academic Freedom Privilege in Employ.
ment Litigation: Protecting Higher Education or Shielding Discrimination?, 40 VAND.
L. REV. 1397, 1398 n.4 (1987).
6. Id. Section 1983 of the United States Code requires that the alleged civil rights
violation occur "under color of [state law]." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
7. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2155.
8. In fact, as of January 10, 1990, several cases were pending wherein it was al-
leged that a law school faculty member had been denied tenure. L.A. Daily J., Jan. 10,
1990, at 9, col. 1.
the discovery of confidential material involving the tenure process.9
The obvious intent of Congress to eradicate discriminatory practices
in academia necessarily clashed with university autonomy. A faculty
member who has been denied tenure on discriminatory grounds has a
right to discover the relevant material on which to base a claim.' 0
On the other hand, a university has a right to choose who may teach
without unnecessary state involvement.ii Moreover, the state has an
interest in protecting each of these rights. Title VII recognizes state
interests in preventing discrimination in the university and promot-
ing academic freedom' 2 so as to encourage the university to be a
"marketplace of ideas."13 The courts' attempts to balance these in-
terests led to a split in the circuits regarding the validity of an aca-
demic freedom privilege.' 4 The Supreme Court settled the split, by
unanimous decision, in University of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission.'5
This Note will discuss the Court's decision and its impact. Section
II will provide the historical background of the tenure process and its
role on university campuses.' 6 This section will also consider the im-
portance of peer review in the tenure process and necessity of confi-
dentiality in insuring effective peer review. Furthermore, section II
will provide a background of the legal issues involved in University
of Pennsylvania, including the proposed academic freedom privilege
and the constitutional and common law justifications thereof.' 7
Lastly, this section will discuss prior decisions of various courts,
which have been divided on whether to recognize confidential tenure
reviews as privileged.
Next, section III will examine the factual setting and procedural
9. Tenure is the means by which university faculty members are promoted. The
Association of American University Professors [hereinafter AAUP] explains the pur-
pose of tenure as: "a means to certain ends; specifically: (1) Freedom of teaching and
research and of extramural activities and (2) a sufficient degree of economic security
to make the profession attractive to men and women of ability." AMERICAN ASS'N OF
UNIV. PROFESSORS, ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE: A HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS at 34-35 (1969) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
10. The right to discover relevant information is codified by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding
any matter, not, privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action .... ).
11. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("The essentiality
of freedom in The Community of American universities is almost self-evident." (quot-
ing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957))).
12. For historical analysis of academic freedom, see O'Neil, Academic Freedom
and the Constitution, 11 J.C.U.L. 275 (1984).
13. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
14. See injfra notes 149-73 and accompanying text.
15. 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990).
16' See infra notes 21-55 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 56-148 and accompanying text.
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history which gave rise to University of Pennsylvania.18 Section IV
will then analyze the Court's unanimous decision, delivered by Jus-
tice Blackmun, which denies any privilege with regard to university
peer review.19
Section V will evaluate the practical impact of University of Penn-
sylvania on the tenure process and future discrimination claims.20 It
will also discuss alternatives which Congress or the courts may em-
ploy to protect confidential peer review, including evidentiary privi-
leges. Finally, this Note will conclude that the Supreme Court has
dealt a severe blow to arbitrary discrimination in tenure practices so
long as candor remains a part of the peer review process.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE LEGAL ISSUE
A Peer Review Within 'the Tenure Process
Most universities utilize a peer review system whereby faculty
members receive tenure.21 The process varies among universities,
but generally involves what is known as an "up or out" system.22
Under this system, a faculty member serves a number of years as a
junior faculty member until his application for tenure is reviewed.23
At that point, the applicant is either granted tenure or is out of a
job.24
The tenure process generally includes review of applicants by their
peers.25 Peer review allows scholars in the candidate's field to assist
in determining whether the candidate is qualified to continue teach-
18. See infra notes 174-210 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 211-59 and accompanying text.
20. See irkfra notes 260-96 and accompanying text.
21. AAUP encourages 'he following academic tenure guidelines:
After the expiration of a probationary period, teachers ... should have perma-
nent or continuous tenure, and their service should be terminated only for ad-
equate cause .... [The probationary period should not exceed seven years
.... Notice should be given at least one year prior to the expiration of the
probationary period if the teacher is not to be continued in service after the
expiration of that period.
HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 36-37.
22. Comment, An Academic Freedom Privilege in the Peer Review Context: In re
Dinnan and Gray v. Board of Higher Education, 36 RuTGERS L. REV. 286, 296 (1983).
23. Id.
24. Id. For an in-depth discussion of the process by which tenure is granted, see
Yurko, Judicial Recognition of Academic Collective Interests: A New Approach To
Faculty Title Litigation, 60 B.U.L. REV. 473, 475-82 (1980).
25. Lee, Balancing Confidentiality and Disclosure in Faculty Peer Review: Impact
of Title VII Litigation, 9 J.C.U.L. 279, 279 n.2 (1983).
ing at the particular university.26 The peer review system operates
on the premise that senior faculty members within the candidate's
department possess a better understanding of the particular field of
study and the necessary qualifications and can therefore better evalu-
ate an applicant's level of expertise than a president or board mem-
ber.27 It has been argued that peer review is the most effective and
fairest means of promoting qualified teachers.28
The peer review process, however, can be manipulated to such an
extent that the entire tenure process may be abused. Often, those
who evaluate tenure candidates are influenced by "nonmeritorious
considerations." 29 Because senior faculty members are susceptible to
individual prejudice, bias and other unwanted criteria often infiltrate
the tenure process.3 0 University and departmental politics may also
taint peer recommendations.3 1 It has been alleged that the subjectiv-
ity of peer review has created a "good old boy" system at universities
which often exclude women and minorities.3 2
B. The Role of Confudentiality
The confidentiality of evaluations made by senior faculty members
serves to foster the potential for abuse in a tenure system which re-
lies upon peer review for promotion of junior faculty members.33
Universities argue, however, that confidentiality is a necessary com-
ponent of the peer review process.3 4 Additionally, confidentiality is
perhaps more important in the university context than in other occu-
26. Comment, supra note 22, at 296.
27. Id. Normally, senior faculty members will review the candidate and make a
recommendation to the president of the university as to professional competence and
whether or not a tenured position should be extended. The president then forwards
this recommendation to the board of trustees. However, in most instances, this process
is merely ritual in that "the president and the board members simply endorse the rec-
ommendation of the faculty committees." Id.
28. Comment, Out of Balance: The Disruptive Consequences of EEOC v. Franklin
& Marshall College, 50 U. Pr. L. REv. 323, 339 n.73 (1988). See also EEOC v. Franklin
and Marshall College, 775 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986);
Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp. 1328, 1346 (W.D. Pa. 1977) ('[Ilt is
apparent that a well informed decision can only be made by the colleagues with whom
the faculty member has worked.").
29. Comment, Academic Freedom v. Title VII: Will Equal Employment Opportu-
nity be Denied on Campus?, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 989, 1003 (1981).
30. Comment, supra note 22, at 298.
31. Id.
32. Comment, supra note 29, at 1003 n.25 ("Women and minorities tend to be ex-
cluded from the academic profession ... because they are outside of the prestige sys-
tem entirely." (quoting Solomon & Heeter, Affirmative Action in Higher Education:
Towards a Rationale for Preference, 52 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 41, 72 (1976))).
33. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
34. See EEOC v. Franklin and Marshall College, 775 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986); EEOC v. University of Notre Dame Du Lac, 715 F.2d
331, 336-37 (7th Cir. 1983); and Amicus Curiae Brief for Petitioner at 2, EEOC v. Uni-
versity of Pa. 850 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1988) (No. 87-1547).
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pations because the tremendous interest in providing students with
the most qualified teachers can best be furthered by a "rigorous and
critical" review of the candidate's performance. 35 It is said, therefore,
that "confidentiality is a prerequisite" for peer review to attain the
necessary level of effectiveness.36 The retraction of confidentiality
could have disastrous effects on the peer review process.3 7 The po-
tential "chilling effect" on faculty candor would be the most damag-
ing result of the denial of confidentiality.38 Evaluators might become
less honest, critical, and forthright3 9 if their statements were to be-
come a matter of public record, or if they feared being called to tes-
tify at trial.40 This "chilling effect" could weaken the review process
in several ways. For instance, since those who ultimately decide
whether a faculty member receives tenure rely almost exclusively on
peer review, it is conceivable that unqualified faculty members could
receive tenure if the evaluators are not completely frank.41 Further-
more, once it becomes obvious that peer review is no longer candid,
decision-makers will not rely on written peer evaluations.42 They
might then rely on undocumented statements which would further
reduce fairness and accuracy.43
Forced disclosure of peer review files might cause other difficulties
within the tenure process. First of all, it may become increasingly
difficult to locate faculty members who are willing to review tenure
candidates, knowing that the evaluation is not held in strict confi-
dence. 44 Second, disclosure could create tension among colleagues at
35. See Smith, Protacting the Confidentiality of Faculty Peer Review Records: De-
partment of Labor v. The University of California, 8 J.C.U.L. 20, 22 (1981).
36. See McKillop v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 386 F. Supp. 1270, 1276 (N.D. Cal.
1975).
37. Comment, Preventing Unnecessary Intrusions on University Autonomy: A
Proposed Academic Freedom Privilege, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 1538, 1551 (1981) ("Compel-
ling a university to disclose its secret tenure ballots and confidential faculty evalua-
tions imposes significant burdens on institutional academic freedom.").
38. Id. (this "chilling effect" may serve to diminish the thoroughness of evalua-
tions, resulting in an erosion of the integrity and candor of the peer review system).
39. Id. See also Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579, 581 (4th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977); McKillop, 386 F. Supp. at 1276.
40. Lee, supra note 25, at 282.
41. See Kroll, Title IX Sex Discrimination Regulations: Private Colleges and Aca-
demic Freedom, 13 URB. L. ANN. 107, 115 (1977). See also Smith, supra note 35, at 22-
23.
42. Comment, supra note 37, at 1551-52.
43. Id. at 1552. See also, Recent Development, supra note 5, at 1409-10 n.73.
44. A letter from an outside evaluator to the University of California, Berkeley,
suggests the reluctance to evaluate a candidate in the absence of confidence:
I want to make it perfectly clear that this is a confidential assessment and is
a university.45 Finally, the democratic ideal of a secret ballot within
the tenure process would be completely meaningless if the reviewers'
identities and votes were available to the disgruntled candidate.'4
Thus, the absence of confidentiality could conceivably undermine the
peer review process, eroding its integrity and value.47
On the other hand, opponents of a privilege protecting peer review
evaluations argue that while confidentially may promote candor in
these evaluations, it may also serve to conceal the true motivation be-
hind a negative recommendation.48 Complete confidentiality allows a
reviewer to opine solely on the basis of his own "bias, bigotry, and
discriminatory attitudes."49 The potential dangers of a confidential
peer review system are exacerbated by individual subjectivity.50
Moreover, as one commentator argues, disclosure of peer review
material, under certain circumstances, might not have such a drastic
impact on the peer review system.51 For example, most applicants
who are denied tenure will not file a discrimination suit.5 2 Nonethe-
less, the possibility of disclosure of peer review evaluations might en-
courage reviewers to be more objective in their evaluations and to
provide proper, nonprejudicial bases for their recommendations.5 3
Additionally, universities might restructure the peer review process
so that committee records are more complete and evaluations more
not to be regarded otherwise. If it should turn out that your attempt to main-
tain confidentiality breaks down, then you must delete this letter from your
file and make no further use of it. If you then wish support from me in the
form of a letter that can be shown to the candidate, then you should write me
again asking for me to put on paper a suitably bland version of my opinion of
the case. I take it, however, that what you are asking for at the moment is a
really thorough and frank assessment which it would, in my view be quite in-
appropriate to give to the candidate, and I want you plainly to understand that
you are in no circumstances to do that.
Smith, supra note 35, at 22 n.9.
45. See Comment, supra note 37, at 1552.
46. Cf Comment, Balancing Academic Freedom and Civil Rights: Toward an Ap-
propriate Privilege for the Votes of Academic Peer Review Committees, 68 IOWA L.
REV. 585, 593-94 (1983) (however, the secret ballot privilege does not apply to the peer
review process in that the privilege only applies to political election); Blaubergs v.
Board of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. (In re Dinnan), 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. Unit B
Nov. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982) (upholding contempt citation of a profes-
sor who refused to disclose vote).
47. See Comment, supra note 37, at 1551-52.
48. See Note, Autonomy and Accountability: The University of California and the
State Constitution, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 927, 940 (1987).
49. Id. (additionally, confidentiality may shield the use of impermissible or arbi-
trary criteria in the evaluation process).
50. See Lee, supra note 25, at 303 ("The system relies upon trust, moral persua-
sion, and subjective analysis - which makes the system potentially abusive .... ).
51. Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1450, 1627 (1985) [hereinafter Developments].
52. Id. As an illustration, many unsuccessful tenure candidates are white men, so
a claim of discrimination is probably untenable.
53. Id.
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thorough.54 Thus, instead of deteriorating the peer review process,
the threat of disclosure might paradoxically lead to a process by
which tenure is decided on legitimate, academic grounds.55
C. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
1. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Title VII, as amended, prohibits an employer from "fail[ing] or
refus[ing] to hire or ... discharg[ing] any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual ... because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."5 6 The Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act of 197257 amended Title VII to prohibit dis-
crimination against "certain employees (primarily teachers) of
educational institutions."56 Thus, Title VII proscribes discrimination
in the hiring practices of universities with regard to their faculty.
Title VII also created and empowered the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (the Commission).59 The statute requires a
victim of discrimination to file a written, sworn charge alleging an
"unlawful employment practice. '6 0 The Commission then investi-
gates to determine the legitimacy of the charge. After the investiga-
tion, if the Commission has "reasonable cause" to believe that the
allegations are true,6 ' it should attempt to convince the employer to
"eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice."6 2 If the
employer is unwilling to conciliate, the Commission may institute a
civil action thirty days after the charge is filed with the
Commission. 63
The statute authorizes the Commission to obtain any evidence
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
57. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
58. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. at 26, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2161.
59. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5 (1982).
60. Id. at § 2000e-5(b). The charge may be filed by the victim, by someone else on
behalf of the victim, or by a member of the Commission. Id
61. Id. The Commission has 120 days to determine the validity of the charge. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at § 2000e-5(f)(1). If the Commission does not bring an action within 180
days, the claimant may bring a private action, but the Commission may still bring an
action even if the 180 days have expired where the case is of "general public impor-
tance." IL See also Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977) (a complain-
ant may, after expiration of the 180-day limitation period from the date when his
charge was filed, bring a private action to enforce his claim).
which "relates to unlawful employment practices... and is relevant
to the charge under investigation."64 The Commission may issue ad-
ministrative subpoenas to obtain relevant evidence,6 5 and the United
States Supreme Court has interpreted the term "relevant" broadly in
discussing the Commission's authority to issue subpoenas.-6 The
Commission need not determine the strength of the claimant's case,
and need only show that the claim is valid and the evidence sought
by the subpoena is relevant to the claim of discrimination.67 The
Commission has broad discretionary authority to determine what evi-
dence may be sought by subpoena.
To assure that information sensitive to the employer is not re-
vealed to the public, Title VII forbids the disclosure of any informa-
tion obtained by the Commission. 68 An employee of the Commission
who makes public the information obtained by subpoena has commit-
ted a misdemeanor and is subject to a $1000 fine or one year in
prison. 69 This threat of criminal penalties safeguards confidential
material from undue disclosure.
2. Burden of Proof
Title VII litigation generally occurs in three stages of proof,70 and
this three-step framework has been adapted to university employ-
ment situations.71 The plaintiff must first prove a prima facie case.
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,72 the Supreme Court estab-
lished four requirements to prove a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion. As applied to the university setting,73 the test requires a
plaintiff to prove: (1) that he or she is a member of a protected class;
(2) that the plaintiff was qualified for the position sought; (3) that the
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1982).
65. Section 10OOe-9 incorporates the investigatory powers of section 161 of Title 29,
which pertains to the right of the Natural Labor Relations Board to obtain and sub-
poena evidence. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-9.
66. See, e.g., EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 68, 72 n.26 (1984) ("the Commis-
sion may insist that the employer disgorge any evidence relevant to the allegations of
discrimination contained in the charge, regardless of the strength of the evidentiary
foundation for those allegations").
67. Id at 72 n.26.
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-8(e) & 2000e-5(b).
69. Id, at § 2000e-8(e). If the information was obtained during the informal discus-
sions between the Commission and the employer, the individual who discloses the in-
formation is subject to both one year in prison and a $1000 fine. Id. at § 2000e-5(b).
70. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).
71. See Smith v. University of N.C., 632 F.2d 316, 332-33 (4th Cir. 1980) ("Many
courts in setting forth the elements of proof and allocating the burdens of proof in
ADEA [Age Discrimination in Employment Act] cases have borrowed the principles
enunciated in the Title VII case of McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green."). For a com-
plete discussion of the burden of proof in Title VII cases, see Lee, supra note 25, at
287-96.
72. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
73. Smith, 632 F.2d at 332-33.
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plaintiff did not receive the position despite being qualified; and (4)
that the position was vacant and that the university continued to in-
terview similarly qualified applicants.
Once the plaintiff has proven a prima facie case, the university de-
fendant has the opportunity to rebut the plaintiff's case by offering a
legitimate and nondiscriminatory explanation for its employment de-
cision.74 The rebuttal requires only a production of evidence to meet
the burden,75 and therefore, the university need not persuade the
trier of fact, but must merely produce a nondiscriminatory
justification.7 6
The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff "to prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the
[university] were not its true reasons, but instead a pretext for dis-
crimination. ' 77 It is particularly difficult to discredit a university's
justifications because courts generally give deference to the academic
decisions of universities.7 8 However, in cases where plaintiffs have
been successful on their claims of pretext, the reasons articulated for
denial of tenure were inconsistent with the university's conduct, 79
thereby validating a claim of pretext.
D. The Proposed Academic Freedom Privilege
The question of whether tenure review files should remain confi-
dential is in fact a by-product of the larger question of whether uni-
versity tenure review deserves an evidentiary privilege. Federal Rule
of Evidence 501 lays the groundwork for privileges recognized in fed-
74. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. See also Smith, 632 F.2d at 332-33.
75. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981); Board
of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 29 (1978).
76. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs, 450 U.S. at 254-55 ("The defendant need
not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons.").
77. Id. at 253; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; Smith, 632 F.2d at 333.
78. See ikf"a notes 116-25 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Sweeney v. Board of Trustees, 604 F.2d 106, 110-11 (1st Cir. 1979) (in
denying a female professor a promotion, the university claimed plaintiff had "personal-
ized professorial matters," was difficult to work with, and did not contribute to campus
committees; however, the university had awarded her tenure two years prior, and after
filing of the discrimination suit, promoted her the following year), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1045 (1980); Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532, 538-39 (3d Cir. 1980) (uni-
versity contended that the reason why female instructor was denied tenure was failure
to complete master's degree, but three male faculty members were promoted despite
the lack of such completion); Mecklenberg, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11,438 (D.
Mont. Feb. 17, 1976) (department chairperson criticized plaintiff's research and teach-
ing, but had previously recommended her for promotion and given her a merit pay
increase).
eral courts.80 Rule 501 provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or pro-
vided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursu-
ant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness ... shall be governed by
the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of
the United States in the light of reason and experience. 8 1
Thus, four distinct sources may establish a privilege according to
Rule 501: the Constitution, acts of Congress, decisions of the Supreme
Court, and common law principles.82  Commentators conclude, as
supported by legislative history, that Rule 501 was designed to en-
courage flexibility and to allow courts to create new privileges as
deemed necessary.8 3 A court might thus declare that the role of con-
fidentiality in the tenure review process is worthy of an evidentiary
privilege based on either constitutional or common law grounds.84
1. Academic Freedom: The Constitutional Basis
a. A "Special Concern" of the Constitution
Academic freedom85 is the ideal that academicians must be allowed
to research and propose novel concepts without interference.8 More
80. FED. R. EVID. 501.
81. Id.
82. For a discussion of the "analytical framework" of Rule 501, see Comment,
supra note 37, at 1540-42. See also Recent Development, supra note 5, at 1399-1400.
83. Comment, supra note .37 at 1541-42; Recent Development, supra note 5, at
1399-1400. Representative Hungate, an author of the Federal Rules of Evidence, noted
that Rule 501 was "intended to provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules
of privilege on a case-by-case basis." 120 CONG. REc. 40, 891 (1973) (remarks by Rep.
Hungate).
84. For a discussion of the common law and constitutional basis of an academic
privilege, see infra notes 85-148 and accompanying text. While Rule 26(c) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure may afford protection to confidential peer reviews by
way of a protective order, it is discretionary in application and does not amount to an
evidentiary privilege. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c). See also Comment, supra note 37, at
1543-44; Recent Development, supra note 5, at 1404-06.
85. Academic freedom has its roots in the German concept of Lehfreiheit which
means the freedom to teach. Comment, upra note 29, at 993. In America, the first
glimpse of academic freedom was in a 1894 declaration by the Board of Regents of the
University of Wisconsin, which has been "hailed as the Magna Carte of academic free-
dom in America." Lee, supra note 25, at 288-89 (the regents refused to criticize or dis-
miss a professor for "possibly visionary opinions").
86. For a discussion of the doctrine of academic freedom, see Comment, Kahn v.
Superior Court of the County of Santa Clara: The Right to Pri vacy and the Academic
Freedom Privilege with Respect to Confidential Peer Review Materials, 15 J.C.U.L. 73,
74 (1988). One definition of academic freedom states:
Academic freedom is the freedom of the teacher or "research worker" in
higher institutions of learning to investigate and discuss the problems of his
science and to express his conclusions, whether through publication or in the
instruction of students, without interference from political or ecclesiastical au-
thority, or from the administrative officials of the institution in which he is
employed, unless his methods are found by qualified bodies of his own profes-
sion to be clearly incompetent or contrary to professional ethics.
[Vol. 18: 213, 1990] University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC
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eloquently, "it is the absolute freedom of thought, of inquiry, of dis-
cussion, and of teaching, of the academic profession."87 Academic
freedom encourages search for the truth which may be reached only
by the "continual and fearless sifting and winnowing" of scholars.88
All of society is the benefactor of such a search.8 9
The Supreme Court first recognized academic freedom in Sweezy v.
New Hampshire,90 acknowledging the societal interest in protecting
the free flow of ideas at universities. 91 The Court in Sweezy over-
turned a contempt citation against a professor who refused to disclose
his political beliefs or the contents of his lectures during a state in-
vestigation.92 The plurality opinion noted that imposing a "strait
jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities
would imperil the future of our Nation."93
Perhaps the most quoted opinion on academic freedom is the con-
curring opinion of Justice Frankfurter. 94 He proclaimed that univer-
sity studies should remain "as unfettered as possible,"95 and that the
government should intrude only when its reasons are "exigent and
obviously compelling."9 6
Following Sweezy, the next major development with regard to aca-
demic freedom occurred in Keyishian v. Board of Regents.97 In Keyi-
shian, the Supreme Court stressed the importance of allowing the
university to be a "marketplace of ideas," because the future depends
Comment, supra note 29, at 994 (citing Lovejoy, Academic Freedom, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 384, 384 (1930)).
87. Comment, supra note 22, at 291.
88. Id. at 289 (quoting R. HOFSTAIYrER & W. METTGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AC-
ADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES 426 (1955)).
89. Id.
90. 354 U.S. 234 (1957). Individual Justices had endorsed academic freedom prior
to Sweezy in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196-98 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring) ("teachers must be examples of open-mindedness and free inquiry") and Adler v.
Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 510-11 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (in the absence of aca-
demic freedom "[i]nstruction tends to become sterile, pursuit of knowledge is discour-
aged; [and] discussion often leaves off where it should begin.").
91. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250. Chief Justice Warren is quoted as saying in the major-
ity opinion, '"The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is
almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is
played by those who guide and train our youth." Id
92. Id. at 235.
93. Id. at 250.
94. For an in depth discussion of Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion, See in-
fra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
95. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
96. Id.
97. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
on "leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of
ideas which discovers truth."9 8 The Court concluded that academic
freedom is "a special concern of the First Amendment, which does
not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom." 99
With this decision, the Court established constitutional protection for
academic freedom.100
b. Institutional Versus Individual Academic Freedom
Historically, academic freedom was recognized as that which pro-
tected individual teachers and professors from interference from the
government or university administration.' 0l Increasingly, universi-
ties began asserting an institutional academic freedom which would
allow them to make academic decisions free from government intru-
sion.' 0 2 It was argued that without autonomy, an institution would
be unable to maintain individual academic freedom. 0 3 If the govern-
ment were allowed to regulate university policy, the academic free-
dom of individuals within the university might be worthless. 0 4 The
main contribution universities make to society is the development of
free-thinking individuals, matured in an unrestricted, intellectual en-
vironment. Such a contribution will only survive in an atmosphere
which is free from intrusion.105
The concept of institutional academic freedom as protected by the
first amendment was endorsed, albeit in a limited manner, by the
Supreme Court. 08 Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in
Sweezy provided first glimpse of a constitutional basis for institu-
98. Id. at 603.
99. Id.
100. Comment, supra note 37, at 1545-46 (more recently, Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), reaffirmed that academic freedom is to be afforded
institutional protection). One commentator has noted that although a "special concern
of the First Amendment," academic freedom has "[never] risen to the level of a consti-
tutional right." See Comment, supra note 29, at 994.
101. Comment, supra note 86, at 74. See also Comment, supra note 46, at 590-91.
102. Comment, supra note 86, at 75 (the theory of institutional academic freedom is
derived from the traditional doctrine of academic freedom merged with the concept of
institutional autonomy). See also Comment, upra note 46, at 591.
103. See Finkin, On "Institutional" Academic Freedom, 61 TEX. L. REV. 817, 829
(1983).
104. Comment, supra note 46, at 591 ("If the university is subject to direct govern-
mental regulation of thoughts and ideas, an individual's privilege would be of question-
able value.").
105. Comment, supra note 37, at 1550. ("The university's contribution to social pro-
gress is the ultimate justification for [institutional] academic freedom."). Id.
106. Id. at 1547. The Supreme Court has never explicitly upheld nor neglected con-
stitutional protection for institutional academic freedom. However, an endorsement is
perceived in that it has been the Court's practice to respect institutional academic free-
dom and university autonomy. Id.
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tional academic freedom.10 7 Justice Frankfurter noticed the need to
avert "governmental intervention in the intellectual life of a univer-
sity."s0 8 Moreover, he recognized "four essential freedoms" for a uni-
versity.109 The university has the freedom to determine "on
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall
be taught, and who may be admitted to study.""no
The Supreme Court further approved the concept of institutional
academic freedom in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke."' In upholding a university's right to consider race as a crite-
ria in its admissions policy,"l 2 the Court cited Justice Frankfurter's
"four essential freedoms.""i 3 Justice Powell, writing for the major-
ity, endorsed an institution's constitutional right of academic free-
dom, including the "selection of its student body.""x4
Despite this support, the majority of the Supreme Court has
neither denied nor confirmed the existence of an institutional aca-
demic freedom." 5 However, courts have historically demonstrated a
certain amount of deference toward university decisions, thus pro-
moting university autonomy."i6 Intrusions into academic policies by
the judiciary were considered inappropriate."x 7 Much deference was
given to evaluations by faculty members in early Title VII cases." 8
Judicial abstention was most' apparent in the sex discrimination
cases,"X9 as evidenced by the fact that all of the first approximately
thirty Title VII cases involving sex discrimination were decided in
favor of the university defendants.120
107. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 262-63 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
108. Id. at 262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Reports of the University
Grants Committee in Great Britain, Open Universities in South Africa 10-12).
110. Id.
111. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
112. Id. at 272.
113. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
114. See id.
115. Comment, supra note 37, at 1548.
116. Note, supra note 48, at 948.
117. Lee, supra note 25, at 284.
118. Id. The courts avoided questioning employment decisions as well as adminis-
trative decisions. Id.
119. Note, supra note 48, at 942 n.93. See also Gray, Academic Freedom and Non-
discrimination: Enemies or Allies?, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1591, 1596 (1988) ("Commentators
often attribute this deference to the complexity and specialized nature of sex discrimi-
nation cases and courts' lack of familiarity with academic procedures.").
120. Note, supra note 48, at 942 n.93 (citing H. EDWARDS & V. NORDIN HIGHER EDU-
CATION AND THE LAW 14 (1979)). Only four plaintiffs prevailed in the approximately
The peak of this "academic abstention"121 came in Faro v. New
York University.122 Faro was a sex discrimination case in which the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated: "[o]f all fields, which the fed-
eral courts should hesitate to invade and take over, education and
faculty appointments at a University level are probably the least
suited for federal court supervision."'123 This statement conflicts with
the intent of Congress in amending Title VII to prohibit discrimina-
tion in educational institutions.2 However, a justification for this
deferential treatment is that the opinions of professors are beyond
the expertise of the court.125
Courts soon began to notice that plaintiffs carried a heavier burden
of proof with regards to Title VII cases in the university setting than
in other employment situations. 26 Courts altered their approach so
that decisions based on academic grounds continued to receive defer-
ence, but the legislative intent would also be considered.127 One
court asserted:
The fact that the discrimination in this case took place in an academic rather
than commercial setting does not permit the court to abdicate its responsibil-
ity to insure the award of a meaningful remedy. Congress did not intend that
those institutions Which employ persons who work primarily with their
mental faculties should enjoy a different status under Title VII than those
which employ persons who work primarily with their hands.
1 2 8
Even Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sweezy, which dis-
cussed the origin of institutional academic freedom, limited the scope
of a university's academic freedom to "academic grounds." 129 There-
fore, while the Supreme Court has endorsed the ideal of institutional
fifty academic discrimination cases litigated between 1970 and 1982. Lee, supra note
25, at 281 n.18.
121. Note, supra note 48, at 942.
122. 502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974).
123. Id. at 1231-32.
124. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
125. Lee, supra note 25, at 285 (other courts have used the "Faro" deference state-
ment to justify their reluctance to evaluate the legality of personnel decisions). See
also Clark v. Whiting, 607 F.2d 634, 640 (4th Cir. 1979) ("Courts are not qualified to
review and substitute their judgment for these subjective, discretionary judgments of
professional experts on faculty promotions or to engage independently in an intelligent
informal comparison of the scholarly consultations or teaching talents of one faculty
member granted a promotion.").
126. For a discussion of the cases which began to note the differential in proof be-
tween university and other employment settings, see Note, supra note 48, at 943-44.
See also Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150, 1153 (2d Cir. 1978) ("anti-interven-
tionist policy has rendered colleges and universities virtually immune to charges of
employment bias"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984 (1978).
127. See, e.g., Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532, 548-51 (3d Cir. 1980) (rec-
ognizing that the courts "should not substitute this judgment for that of the college
with respect to the qualifications of faculty" yet refusing to "shirk the responsibility
placed on [the courts] by Congress").
128. Id. at 550.
129. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
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freedom, the federal courts have been reluctant to extend such a
freedom beyond deference for university decisions based on academic
grounds.
2. The Common Law Basis
a. The Common Law Analysis
The recognition of a privilege demonstrates that certain societal in-
terests are more valuable than discovery of the truth.130 Professor
Wigmore suggested four factors for determining the existence of a
privilege:
(1) The communications must originate in a confutence'that they will not be
disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfac-
tory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to
be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of. the com-
munication must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation.
13 1
One commentator asserts that courts typically undertake a similar
analysis which involves only three factors.132 In the case of the pro-
posed academic freedom privilege, the courts would typically balance
the need to fully disclose relevant information with the social impor-
tance of the university's academic freedom and peer confidential-
ity.' 33 Assuming the balance tips in favor of a privilege, courts must
further find that the privilege is necessary to protect the societal in-
terest at stake.134
Another commentator suggests that Wigmore's analysis for estab-
lishing a common law privilege, or any variation thereof, is not appli-
cable to the university peer review process, because the focus should
130. Comment, supra note 46, at 586 (construed in Blaubergs v. Board of Regents
of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. (In re Dinnan), 661 F.2d 426, 429 (5th Cir. Unit B Nov. 1981),
cert denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982)). A privilege is recognized if it would "promote suf-
ficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence in the admin-
istration of... justice." Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
131. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285 (1961).
132. Comment, supra note 37, at 1556. The three factors to. be weighed are (1) the
need to fully disclose all relevant information; (2) the social importance attached to
the interest which would otherwise be revealed in the absence of privilege; and (3) the
necessity of protedting the asserted interest through recognition of an evidentiary priv-
ilege. ld. For a thorough discussion of the application of these elements in establish-
ing a common law privilege, see id. at 1556-61.
133. See id. at 1556-61.
134. Id. at 1560 ("a privilege is unnecessary if the interest at stake would be pro-
tected even without assurances of confidentiality").
not be on the relationship between the parties.'3 5 He believes, there-
fore, that a "qualified topic privilege," which may apply even in the
absence of a special relationship, would be more appropriate. 3 6
b. The Supreme Court's Creation of Privilege
In general, even with the flexibility allowed by Rule 501,137 the
Supreme Court has been reluctant to recognize new privileges.' 3
The Court has recognized privileges based on well-established consti-
tutional, historical, and statutory grounds, 3 9 such as those which
protect grand jury proceedings,140 petit jury deliberations, 14 1 and in-
tra-governmental documents.14 2 The Court even acknowledged the
importance of confidentiality when it recognized an executive privi-
lege, albeit a qualified one, which protects the confidentiality of pres-
idential communications. 143 This executive privilege was based on
the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.144
The Court has also denied a proposed privilege allegedly based on
the Constitution. In Branzburg v. Hayes,45 a reporter contended
that revealing the source of his information, after a guarantee of con-
fidentiality, would inhibit the freedom of the press as protected by
the first amendment. 146 The Court, however, refused to recognize a
135. Comment, supra note 46, at 592-93, 599 (arguing that Wigmore's test is not ap-
plicable because there is no special relationship between the parties in a peer review
setting that needs protection).
136. Mdi at 599-600. A "topic privilege" is preferable because a personal relationship
for application of the privilege is unnecessary, the balancing. of interests required
under the Wigmore analysis is avoided, and the plaintiff must only prove a "likelihood
of discrimination" for the materials to be discoverable. Id at 589-600. The privilege
would be similar to other privileges, such as those protecting state secrets or other con-
fidential government documents. Developments, aupra note 51, at 1592 n.1.
137. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
138. Lee, supra note 25, at 307. Chief Justice Burger's statement in United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), exemplifies this reluctance: "Whatever their origins....
[privileges] are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in deroga-
tion of the search for truth." Id at 710.
139. University of Pa. v. EEOC, 110 S. Ct. 577, 585 (1990).
140. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops N.W., 441 U.S. 211, 218 n.9 (1979) (recogniz-
ing that grand jury proceedings have depended on secrecy since the seventeenth
century).
141. See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1933) ("[IThe arguments and
votes of jurors . . . are secrets protected from disclosure unless the privilege is
waived.").
142. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975) (based upon an excep-
tion to the Freedom of Information Act).
143. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) (presidential privilege is "fun-
damental to the operation of Government").
144. Id. at 705-06.
145. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Branzburg v. Hayes is a consideration of two cases, both
concerning newsmen and the right of newsmen to keep their sources of information
confidential in response to a grand jury subpoena to testify.
146. In Branzburg, the reporter of a newspaper story which described the produc-
tion of hashish from marijuana, was subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury. In writ-
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privilege, noting that any negative effect on the freedom of the press
or on the availability of information resulting from forced disclosure
was "unclear."147 The Court thus demonstrated its reluctance to cre-
ate a privilege unless the damage to a constitutionally based right is
clear and unattenuated. 148
E. The Split in the Circuits: Determining the Legitimacy of an
Academic Freedom Privilege
When confronted with discovery requests for peer review materials
by a disgruntled faculty member who alleges discrimination, the re-
spective circuit courts have adopted three basic approaches to a pro-
posed academic freedom privilege: (1) balancing of interests; 49 (2)
recognition of a qualified academic freedom privilege;15 0 and (3) de-
nial of any privilege whatsoever.151
The Second Circuit refused to observe an evidentiary privilege and
instead adopted a balancing approach in Gray v. Board of Higher Ed
ucation, City of New York.152 In Gray, a black professor brought a
discrimination suit against a New York community college after he
was refused promotion and reappointment with tenure.15 3 The court
ing the story, Branzburg had promised the "hashish makers" that he would change
their names in the article. At the grand jury proceeding, Branzburg refused to answer
questions concerning the identities of his informants. Id. at 667-68. The Court also de-
cided the case of a television newsman, Pappas, who had gained entry into a "Black
Panther" headquarters by agreeing not to reveal what happened while he was there.
See id. at 672-73.
147. Id. at 693-94 ("evidence fails to demonstrate that there would be a significant
construction of the flow of news to the public").
148. Id. at 697-700. The Court professed, "We are unwilling to embark the judiciary
on a long and difficult journey to such an uncertain destination." Id. at 703.
149. See Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 692 F.2d 901, 907-08 (2d Cir. 1982) (balanc-
ing educator's need for discovery of tenure votes against college's interest in confiden-
tiality). See also Zaustinsky v. University of Cal., 96 F.R.D. 622, 626 (N.D. Cal. 1983),
aff'd without opinion, 782 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1985); McKillop v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 386 F. Supp. 1270, 1278 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
150. See EEOC v. University of Notre Dame Du Lac, 715 F.2d 331, 337 (7th Cir.
1983) (qualified academic freedom privilege recognized as preventing disclosure of the
identities of persons participating in the peer review process). See also Jackson v.
Harvard Univ., 111 F.R.D. 472, 474 (D. Mass. 1986).
151. Blaubergs v. Board of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. (In re Dinnan), 661 F.2d
426, 427 (5th Cir. Unit B Nov. 1981) (held professor on tenure committee had no privi-
lege to refuse to withhold information concerning his vote), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106
(1982). See also EEOC v. Franklin and Marshall College, 775 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir.
1985), cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986); Rollins v. Farris, 108 F.R.D. 714, 719 (E.D. Ark.
1985).
152. 692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1982).
153. Dr. Gray brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985.
balanced the college's interest of confidentiality against Dr. Gray's in-
terest and determined that the files should be disclosed.154 In so do-
ing, the Second Circuit relied on a brief submitted by the American
Association of University Professors (AAUP) which emphasized that
a university must at least offer an explanation for the denial of ten-
ure.155 The court also stated that a qualified privilege may be appro-
priate when a university provides a meaningful statement of the
reasons for denial.156
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. University of
Notre Dame Du Lac,' 57 the Seventh Circuit recognized a qualified ac-
ademic freedom privilege. The court noted the importance of aca-
demic freedom 58 and confidentiality, 159 but also recognized that
establishing an absolute privilege would be unwise.160 It asserted
that under a qualified privilege, the plaintiff must show a "particular-
ized need" for materials before they can be disclosed.11 The court
believed that this qualified privilege would "preserve the integrity of
the peer review" process while adequately protecting the plaintiff by
allowing discovery when necessary.162 Thus, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that a sufficient balance between academic freedom and
the search for truth was achieved with a qualified privilege.
The Fifth and Third Circuits have refused to allow any protection
for faculty peer review material. 6 3 The Fifth Circuit, in In re Din-
nan,16 4 faced a case in which a faculty evaluator, Professor James
154. Gray, 692 F.2d at 907-08. The Second Circuit held:
Rather than adopting a rule of absolute disclosure, in reckless disregard of the
need of confidentiality, or adopting a rule of complete privilege that would
frustrate reasonable challenges to the fairness of hiring decisions, our decision
today holds that absent a statement of reasons, the balance tips toward discov-
ery and away from recognition of a privilege.
Id. at 908.
155. Id. at 907. The AAUP brief explained that "[i]f an unsuccessful candidate for
reappointment or tenure receives a meaningful written statement of reasons from the
peer review committee and is afforded proper intramural grievance procedures, disclo-
sure of individual votes should be protected by a qualified privilege." Id. (quoting
AAUP Brief at 23).
156. Id. at 908.
157. 715 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1983).
158. Notre Dame, 715 F.2d at 335-36.
159. Id. at 336-37.
160. Id. at 337.
161. Id, at 338. The Seventh Circuit asserted that a relevance standard did not pro-
vide university peer reviews adequate protection from discovery and that a more ap-
propriate standard would allow discovery if the party can show a "'compelling
necessity' for the speciftc information requested." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing
Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops N.W., 441 U.S. 211, 222-23 (1979)).
162. Id. at 339. Interestingly, Notre Dame had offered to produce the documents
with identifying features of those faculty members participating in peer evaluations re-
dacted, but the district court refused the" offer, claiming that the EEOC's need for dis-
covery was "substantial." Id. at 334.
163. See infra notes 166-72 and accompanying text.
164. 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. Unit B Nov. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
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Dinnan, refused to disclose his vote on the tenure application of a
particular faculty member. He was consequently held in con-
tempt.1 65 The court dismissed his claims that his tenure vote was
protected by both academic freedom'6 6 and a common law secret bal-
lot privilege.'67 In fact, the court stated that his arguments were not
"even slightly persuasive."168
The Third Circuit, in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
v. Franklin and Marshall College,'6 9 declared that the standard re-
quired for issuance of Commission subpoenas, simple relevance, 7 0
was met. The court also took note of the legislative history of Title
VII, noting that the goal of eradicating discrimination in universities
outweighed any harm that would be caused to academic freedom.17'
The court also noted that any harm to confidentiality would not un-
dermine the integrity of the peer review process.'7 2
Thus, the Circuits were divided along very distinct lines when the
Supreme Court agreed to hear University of Pennsylvania v. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. 7 3
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Factual History
The University of Pennsylvania (the University) is a private uni-
versity located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Founded in 1740,174 it
now has approximately 18,000 full-time students enrolled in twelve
165. Professor Dinnan served a three month jail sentence and paid $3000 in fines.
Id. at 427.
166. Id. at 431. The Fifth Circuit stated that "[t]o rule otherwise would mean that
the concept of academic freedom would give any institution of higher learning a carte
blanche to practice discrimination of all types." Id. (emphasis in original).
167. Id. at 431-32. The court noted that a secret ballot privilege was limited to polit-
ical ballots. Id. at 432.
168. Id. at 430. Insisting that evaluators be accountable for their actions, the court
stated, "We find nothing heroic or noble about the appellant's position; we see only an
attempt to avoid responsibility for his actions." Id. at 432.
169. 775 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1985), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986).
170. Franklin and Marshall College, 775 F.2d at 116-17.
171. Id. at 114-15.
172. Id. at 115. Although recognizing the importance of confidentiality, and the po-
tential burden upon the tenure process, the court implied that the tenure process
would survive if "the honesty and integrity of the tenured reviewers in evaluation de-
cisions [can] overcome feelings of discomfort and embarrassment." Id.
173. 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990).
174. The University of Pennsylvania was founded by Benjamin Franklin and be-
came the first university in the United States in 1779. Petitioner's Brief at 2, Univer-
sity of Pa. v. EEOC, 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990) (No. 88-493).
schools.175 One of these schools is the Wharton School of Busi-
ness.176 The tenure process at the University includes evaluations
from colleagues within the applicant's department, as well as from
scholars outside the University, which the "Advisory Committee on
Faculty Personnel" considers when determining the future status of
a tenure candidate.177 The University claimed that it was not
unusual for the personnel committee to deny tenure to a candidate
who received favorable recommendations from departmental
colleagues.178
Rosalie Tung, a Chinese-American woman, was hired as an associ-
ate professor in the management department of the Wharton School
of Business in 1981.179 During the 1984-85 academic year, Professor
Tung was a candidate for tenure. 8 0 Her colleagues within the man-
agement department recommended that she receive tenure, but the
personnel committee refused to grant it to her.' 8 ' Professor Tung
was given no explanation for the denial, but she allegedly discovered
that the personnel committee had attempted to justify its decision by
declaring that the school was "not interested in China-related re-
search."' 8 2 Professor Tung believed that this explanation was merely
a pretext for discrimination and that she was at least as qualified as
five male faculty members who had been granted tenure.18 3 She
filed a charge with the Commission, basing her claim on racial and
gender discrimination.18 4
The Commission began an investigation into Professor Tung's alle-
gations by requesting certain documents relevant to her denial of ten-
ure. 8 5  The University agreed to produce a "wide range of
175. University of Pa., 110 S. Ct. at 580.
176. Id
177. Petitioner's Brief at 3, University of Pa. v. EEOC, 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990) (No. 88-
493).
178. Id According to the University, two male candidates were also denied tenure
after they had been recommended by the management department. i at 4 n.1.
179. Id at 3.
180. Id
181. Id Professor Tung was reevaluated after she submitted more material, but
the Committee again refused to recommend her for tenure. Id, at 4.
182. University of Pa., 110 S. Ct. at 580.
183. Id, Professor Tung also contended that the chairman of the management de-
partment had sexually harassed her, and that she was denied tenure because she in-
sisted that their "relationship remain professional." Id&
184. EEOC v. University of Pa., 850 F.2d 969, 972 (3d Cir. 1988), off'd, 110 S. Ct. 577
(1990).
185. Id. The Commission issued a subpoena which sought:
1. Copies of Tung's tenure file;
2. Copies of the tenure files for the five other candidates considered with
Tung for tenure;
3, The identity, tenure status, and qualifications of those individuals who
comprised the tenure committees for the University's management depart-
ment from June, 1984 to the present; and
4. The identity of all members of the University's personnel committee.
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documents" regarding Professor Tung's candidacy for tenure, includ-
ing most of her tenure review file.'8 6 The University, however, re-
fused to provide the materials containing confidential peer
reviews.I8 7 The University wanted the Commission to minimize the
intrusion into the peer review process. 8 8 At the least, the University
requested that the Commission amend its subpoena to exclude peer
review material.189 The Commission, relying on Third Circuit prece-
dent,190 rejected the University's explanation and threatened to bring
an action to enforce its subpoena.191
B. Procedural Facts
Once the Commission refused to amend its subpoena, the Univer-
sity had twenty days within which to comply with the request for
production before the Commission would initiate enforcement pro-
Id.
186. Petitioner's Brief at 4-5, University of Pa. v. EEOC, 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990) (No.
88-493). The University voluntarily produced the following-
[1] the Personnel Committee's statement of reasons for the denial of tenure;
[2] two detailed position statements describing the University's tenure review
process and its treatment of Tung's candidacy for tenure; [3] Tung's complete
personnel file; [4] a chart showing the results of tenure decisions for candi-
dates at the Wharton School which include the sex, national origin, rank and
department of each candidate; [5] a summary of applications and appointments
to Management Department positions by race, sex and national origin; [6] rel-
evant sections from the University's faculty handbook covering faculty struc-
ture, tenure review process and the grievance process; [7] a description of the
University's policies on faculty salary merit increases; [8] charts showing sala-
ries and salary increases for associate professors at Wharton, by national ori-
gin; and [9] information on vacancies, advertisements and recruitment for
positions at Wharton.
lI
187. Id. at 5. The University wanted to avoid producing evaluations from Wharton
faculty as well as outside faculty. Id.
188. University of Pa., 110 S. Ct. at 580-81.
189. Id, at 580. Specifically, the University asked the Commission to exclude:
(1) confidential letters written by Tung's evaluators; (2) the Department
Chairman's letter of evaluation; (3) documents reflecting the internal deliber-
ations of faculty committees considering applications for tenure, including the
Department Evaluation Report summarizing the deliberations relating to
Tung's application for tenure; and (4) comparable portions of the tenure-re-
view files of the five males.
Id.
190. For the leading case on point in the Third Circuit, see EEOC v. Franklin &
Marshall College, 775 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1985) (no qualified academic privilege protect-
ing tenure review information from discovery), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986). For a
discussion of Franklin and Marshall College, see supra notes 171-73 and accompanying
text.
191. University of Pa., 110 S. Ct. at 973.
ceedings. 192 During that grace period, on May 1, 1987, the University,
attempting to avoid adverse precedent in the Third Circuit,193
brought suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia.194 The University
sought to have the Commission's subpoena quashed on the grounds
that it was unconstitutional.195 The Commission filed a motion to
dismiss the action based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, im-
proper venue, and failure to state a claim.196 While this motion was
pending, and six weeks after the University's action was filed, the
Commission filed its own action to enforce the subpoena in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.197
The District Court in Pennsylvania retained jurisdiction, refused to
dismiss the action even though a parallel action had previously been
filed in the District of Columbia, and ordered the University to com-
ply with the subpoena and produce the peer review materials.198 The
Third Circuit affirmed,199 acknowledging a general rule of comity
which allows a court, in an action which was "first-filed," to retain
jurisdiction while any subsequent action involving the same parties
and issues may be enjoined.2oo However, the Third Circuit opined,
the "first-filed" rule is flexible, so that a subsequent court can retain
jurisdiction in spite of it when a case exhibits "rare or extraordinary
circumstances, inequitable conduct, bad faith, or forum shopping."201
The appellate court ruled that the district court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in declining to invoke the "first-filed" rule because the uni-
versity's selection of jurisdiction gave the appearance of forum
shopping.202
The court of appeals then addressed the issue of confidential peer
192. EEOC v. University of Pa., 850 F.2d 969, 972-73 (3d Cir. 1988), aff'd, 110 S. Ct.
577 (1990).
193. See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
194. University of Pa, 850 F.2d at 973. The University filed the action three days
before the grace period expired. Id
195. d, The University claimed that the Commission's nationwide policy to require
peer review disclosures violated the first and fifth' amendments to the U.S. Constitu-
tion, as well as the Administrative Procedure Act. See U.S. CONST. I, V, and the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982). Id,
196. Petitioner's Brief at 7, University of Pa. v. EEOC, 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990) (No. 88-
493)1
197. See University of Pa., 850 F.2d at 973.
198. See id. at 973-74.
199. Id at 972.
200. Id at 971.
201. Ad at 972.
202. 1& Contrarily, the University had argued that it filed the action in the District
of Columbia rather than Philadelphia because "more was at stake than the single
question of the Commission's possible enforcement of the its [sic] subpoena against the
University." Id at 973 (quoting Petitioner's Brief at 6, University of Pa. v. EEOC, 110
S. Ct. 577 (1990) (No. 88-493)).
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review. The court relied exclusively on its prior decision in Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Franklin and Marshall
College,203 and rejected the University's argument that the Commis-
sion's subpoena was unconstitutional.204 The court remanded the
case to the district court to determine whether names and other ma-
terial which would indicate the identity of the evaluators should be
redacted.205
On September 18, 1988, the University petitioned the United States
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari on two issues.2o It challenged
(1) the Commission's right to subpoena confidential peer review
materials, and (2) the district court's disregard for the "first-filed"
rule.2 0 7 On December 12, 1988, to the surprise of many, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to consider only the "first-filed" issue.208
However, after briefs were submitted, and eleven days before oral ar-
guments, the Court amended the grant of certiorari so that only the
academic freedom privilege issue would be heard.209 It is unclear
what caused the change,210 but the Court rescheduled oral arguments
and accepted more briefs so as to finally settle the split in the circuit
courts concerning a proposed privilege for peer review materials
within the university setting.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE OPINION
The United States Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Third
Circuit's decision in University of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission,211 and finally laid to rest the possi-
203. 775 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986).
204. University of Pa., 850 F.2d at 980.
205. Id. at 982.
206. For a brief discussion of the granting of certiorari in this case, see Stewart, A
Switch in Time, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1990, at 42.
207. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, EEOC v. University of Pa., 850 F.2d 969
(3d Cir. 1988) (No. 88-493), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 554 (1988).
208. Stewart, supra note 206, at 42. See also University of Pa. v. EEOC, 109 S. Ct.
554 (1988) (cert. granted).
209. University of Pa. v. EEOC, 109 S. Ct. 1660 (1989) (modifying grant of cert.).
210. One commentator pointed out several possibilities for the Court's "mixup":
Possibly the justices reversed the numbers of the questions in conference, or
perhaps they recorded their decision incorrectly, or perhaps it was transcribed
incorrectly in the clerk's office. It is even possible-though a bit far-fetched-
that the justices intended to hear the [first-filed issue] but changed their
minds after they received the briefs on it.
Stewart, supra note 206, at 43.
211. 110 S. Ct. 577, 587 (1990) (the Court held that the first amendment does not
harbor a right to academic freedom so as to protect confidential peer -review materials'
from discovery in Title VII discrimination cases).
bility of a judicially sanctioned academic freedom privilege. Justice
Blackmun's opinion addressed and discarded the University's pro-
posed privilege as a means by which universities could escape the
reaches of Title VII.212 In so doing, the Court disapproved those cir-
cuits which recognized either a qualified privilege213 or a balancing
approach,21 4 and affirmed the relevance standard for investigations
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission of university dis-
criminatory hiring practices. 215
In rejecting the University's claim that peer review materials of a
candidate for tenure deserve an evidentiary privilege based on com-
mon law principles, Justice Blackmun's opinion emphasized the re-
luctance of the Court to establish new privileges. 21 6 Even though
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence indicates a "congressional
desire" for flexibility in the law of privileges, 217 the Court has been
unwilling to create a privilege unless the interest it protects out-
weighs the need for evidence.218 The Court's balance in this instance
leaned heavily toward the discovery of probative evidence.21 9
The first factor weighed by the Court was the legislative history of
Title VII and its amendment.220 The fact that educational institu-
tions were expressly added to Title VII in 1972 indicates that Con-
gress considered discrimination within universities to be a
"compelling problem."22 ' The Court noted that Congress, in coming
to this conclusion, even pondered the possible harm to university au-
tonomy that Title VII might inflict.222 In fact, the Court acknowl-
edged, the 1972 amendment subjected tenure decisions to the same
scrutiny imposed upon decisions of employers in other fields.223
Therefore, the Commission's statutorily mandated authority to inves-
tigate a charge of discrimination and obtain any evidence that is "rel-
evant to the charge under investigation"224 should pertain equally to
faculty tenure decisions.225
212. Id. at 584.
213. See supra notes 150, 159-63 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 150, 153-56 and accompanying text.
215. University of Pa., 110 S. Ct. at 584-85.
216. Id. at 582.
217. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
218. University of Pa., 110 S. Ct. at 582.
219. Id. The Court asserted that the actual balancing of the interests "is particu-
larly a legislative function." Id. Thus, the Court was persuaded by congressional
intent.
220. See id, at 582-84.
221. Id. at 582.
222. Id. It was noted that the extension of Title VII to educational institutions
might "weaken institutions of higher education by interfering with decisions to hire
and promote faculty members." Id.
223. Id at 583.
224. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 20003-e(a) (1982)).
225. Id The Court dismissed the University's argument that § 2000e-8 gives the
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The University emphasized the importance of confidentiality in the
peer review process and argued that this element should serve to tip
the balance in favor of a privilege.228 However, the Court refused to
weigh this factor.227 First of all, the Court reasoned, Congress pro-
vided a "modicum of protection" for confidential evidence obtained
by the Commission.2 28 During the investigation phase, the Commis-
sion may not disclose any of the confidential information obtained.229
The Court refused to expand this safeguard of confidentiality past
the investigatory phase because the compelling interest in preventing
discrimination in universities would be severely burdened where a
university is "allowed to pick and choose" the evidence to be used
against it.23 The granting of such a privilege for peer review mate-
rial would allow a university to hide crucial evidence behind a veil of
confidentiality, thus hindering the Commission's investigation.23 '
Furthermore, the Court feared a "wave of similar privilege claims"
from other occupations which would result from the granting of a
privilege to university peer reviews.23 2 The Court believed that once
precedent was set, writers, publishers, musicians, and even attorneys
would clamor for recognition of a similar privilege.233 Perceiving a
need to establish a "breakwater," the Court stood behind its decision
that all evidence "relevant" to the claim of discrimination is discover-
able in the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary.234
Finally, in considering a proposed common law privilege, the Court
examined and distinguished prior privileges as established by prece-
Commission authority only to "seek" and not to "acquire" relevant evidence. Id. at
583-84 ("[t]his interpretation simply cannot be reconciled with the plain language of
the text of § 2000e-8(a), which states that the Commission 'shall ... have access' to
'relevant' evidence" (emphasis added)).
226. Ld, at 584.
227. Id. The Court dismissed the argument for confidentiality by saying that the
"costs associated with racial and sexual discrimination in institutions of higher learn-
ing" outweigh the "costs that ensue from disclosure." Id
228. 1d See 42 U.S.C. § 200e-8 (1982) (mandating criminal penalties for those who
disclose confidential information obtained during a Commission investigation).
229. University of Pa., 110 S. Ct. at 584. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8 (1982).
230. University of Pa., 110 S. Ct. at 584 (quoting EEOC v. Franklin and Marshall
College, 775 F.2d 110, 116 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986)).
231. Id. The Court was unwilling to "place a potent weapon in the hands of em-
ployers who have no interest in complying voluntarily with the Act, who wish instead
to delay as long as possible investigations by the EEOC." Id. (quoting EEOC v. Shell
Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 81 (1984)).
232. Id at 585.
233. Id.
234. Id.
dent.235 The Court distinguished the presidential communication
privilege of United States v. Nixon 238 by stating that the executive
privilege, although fashioned on the importance of confidentiality,
was based on the constitutional mandate of the separation of powers
doctrine.237 Contrarily, the Court asserted that the proposed aca-
demic privilege "lacks similar constitutional foundation." 238
However, the Court later addressed the University's argument that
a privilege protecting peer reviews should be created based on the
constitutional notion of academic freedom. 239 In attempting to sub-
stantiate an academic privilege as based upon constituitional grounds,
the University called upon prior cases which established academic
freedom as a "special concern of the First Amendment."240 The Uni-
versity argued that it has a constitutionally protected right to choose
who may teach,241 and that the tenure process was the method by
which this freedom was exercised, and that peer reviews were an es-
sential part of the tenure process. 42 The University further asserted
that confidentiality is essential to the peer review process.243 There-
fore, denying confidentiality would inhibit the University's academic
freedom.244
In reaction to the University's argument, the Court refused to
stretch the cases recognizing academic freedom to fit the facts of the
235. Id.
236. 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (the Court held that the President has a qualified privilege
to refuse to disclose confidential, high-level communications concerning the military,
diplomatic relations, or security secrets).
237. University of Pa., 110 S. Ct. at 585. For a case discussion of the foundation of
the executive privilege as based upon the doctrine of separation of powers, see Nixon,
418 U.S. at 705-06.
238. University of Pa,, 110 S. Ct. at 585. The Court distinguished other precedent
noting that the proposed academic freedom privilege did not have the same "historical
or statutory basis" as other privileges recognized by the Court. Id. See Douglas Oil Co.
v. Petrol Stops N.W., 441 U.S. 211 (1979) (grand jury proceedings); NLRB v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975) (intra-agency documents); Clark v. United States,
289 U.S. 1 (1933) (deliberations of a petit jury).
239. See University of Pa., 110 S. Ct. at 585-88.
240. Id. at 585-86 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
See also Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 511 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (aca-
demic freedom is central to "the pursuit of truth which the First Amendment is
designed to protect").
241. University of Pa., 110 S. Ct. at 586. In reaching this conclusion, the University
emphasized Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
wherein the right to determine "who may teach" was recognized as one of the "four
essential freedoms" that an academic institution enjoys under the first amendment.
Id. at 582. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
242. University of Pa., 110 S. Ct. at 586. ("A properly functioning tenure system
requires the faculty to obtain candid and detailed written evaluations of the candi-
date's scholarship ....").
243. Id. ("It is confidentiality that ensures candor and enlists an institution to
make its tenure decisions on the basis of valid academic criteria.").
244. Id,
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case at hand.245 Justice Blackmun observed that those decisions af-
firming academic freedom were cases in which the government was
attempting to directly regulate the content of academic speech.24
Moreover, the University did not claim that the Commission's sub-
poena constituted such a regulation.247 The Commission was not pro-
viding academic criteria for hiring, but. instead investigating when
nonacademic criteria had been allegedly utilized.48
The Court continued, however, by stating that a university's aca-
demic freedom may still be protected by the first amendment even
when content-based speech is not involved.249 However, the harm to
the University's academic freedom in this case was found to be "ex-
tremely attenuated"250 and speculative.25 ' In demonstrating the
speculative nature of the harm to the University, the Court consid-
ered the potential impact on the peer review process that would re-
sult if confidentiality were not required. It noted that not all peer
review systems rely on confidentiality.2 52 MoreoVer, even if a quali-
fied privilege 'were adopted wherein a showing of "special necessity"
were needed for disclosure, many peer review materials would still
245. Id. at 586-87. See generally Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)
(Court struck down a New York Education law against "treasonable seditious" utter-
ances in public schools); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (struck down
overly-broad state subversive activities act).
246. University of Pa., 110 S. Ct. at 586.
247. Id. at 587 (the University failed to allege that the subpoenas would in fact reg-
ulate "university discourse"). The Court noted that the University was asking for "an
expanded right of academic freedom," because the objections were neither content
based, nor involved a direct infringement on University policy to determine "who may
teach. ' Id. (emphasis in original).
248. Id. The Court cautioned courts to avoid "second-guessing... legitimate aca-
demic judgments" and to "show great respect for the faculty's professional judgment."
Id. (quoting Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S' 214, 225 (1985)).
249. Id. Justice Blackmun acknowledged that content-neutral speech may also be
protected. Id (citing Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,
452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981)). "He further noted that indirect burdens on speech may also
"pose First Amendment concerns." Id. (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449 (1958)).
250. Ad The University's argument was that "disclosure of peer review materials
•.. undermines the confidentiality which is central to the peer review process, and this
in turn is central to the tenure process, which in turn is the means by which [the Uni-
versity] seeks to exercise its asserted academic-freedom right of choosing who will
teach." Id at 587-88. Justice Blackmun pointed out that "[t]o verbalize the claim is to
recognize how distant the burden is from the asserted right." Ld. at 588.
251. Ad
252. Ad (citing G. Bednash, The Relationship Between Access and Selectivity in
Tenure Review Outcomes (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of
Maryland)).
be discovered.2m3 Thus, the Court dismissed the "chilling effect" that
absence of the proposed privilege may cause by rationalizing that at
most, such an effect would "only [be] incrementally worsened."25 '
Furthermore, in the absence of privilege, some evaluators will take
greater care to legitimately justify their critiques and account for
that criticism.2 m Finally, the Court compared the first amendment
ground for the privilege to the proposed privilege in Branzburg v.
Hayes.2 6 The claim in Branzburg was similar to that in the subject
case in that the parties advocating a privilege contended that the de-
struction of confidentiality would "inhibit the free flow of informa-
tion in contravention of First Amendment principles."25 7 Justice
Blackmun commented, by comparing to Branzburg, that not all "inci-
dental burdening" of academic freedom is violative of the first
amendment. -8 Likewise, when the harm to a first amendment right
is uncertain and speculative, the Court has been, and still is, unwill-
ing to grant an evidentiary privilege.259
V. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION
A. Impact on Future Cases
Since discrimination cases are quite common, the refusal of an aca-
demic freedom privilege will potentially have a substantial impact.2 60
However, individuals in both academics and legal fields are unsure of
the actual impact of the decision on pending and future discrimina-
tion cases. 261 Interestingly, a sudden rush to file discrimination cases
is not expected, since plaintiffs must still prove discrimination, a tedi-
ous and expensive task even with the benefit of the peer review eval-
uations.262 The impact of the case would be tremendous, and
discrimination could be proven more easily, if evaluators candidly ex-
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (no reporter's testimonial privilege under the first amend-
ment to refuse to testify to confidential sources and information in a grand jury
proceeding).
257. University of Pa., 110 S. Ct. at 588.
258. Id. (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682). Since the Court held that the Com-
mission's subpoena did not violate the first amendment, it did not address the question
of whether the state's interest in eradicating discrimination outweighed the burden on
first amendment rights. Id. at 589.
259. 1d. at 588 (We are unwilling "to embark the judiciary on a long and difficult
journey to... an uncertain destination." (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 703)).
260. Reuben, Professors Win Case On Tenure, L.A. Daily J., Jan. 10, 1990, at 9, col.
1.
261. See Mooney, Academics Are Divided Over High-Court Ruling on Tenure Docu-
ments, Chron. Higher Educ., Jan. 24, 1990, at Al, col. 2. For a brief discussion of ten-
ure controversies which were pending at the time of the decision, see Reuben, supra
note 260, at 9, col. 1.
262. Blum, Supreme Court Reects Privacy Claim for Tenure Files, Says University
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press their biased views even though their comments are no longer
held in confidence. However, a discriminating evaluator may tone
down his opinion or disguise it with a seemingly legitimate pre-
text, 6 3 in which case Title VII plaintiffs' access to peer review files
will not likely effect the discrimination cases in a substantial man-
ner.264 Although Justice Blackmun explained that if there is a
"smoking gun" 26 5 it will be located in the peer review files, it is possi-
ble that fewer guns will be discovered due to precautions taken by
discriminating evaluators. Therefore, candor must be maintained
even without complete confidentiality if victims of discrimination are
to benefit from the Court's decision.
Further, the decision appears to be limited to administrative sub-
poenas seeking peer review material in discrimination investigations.
The Court emphasized the statutory authority of the Commission
and the safeguards from abuse provided by Title VII.266 The Court
did not address a plaintiff's request for peer review material in a pri-
vate cause of action.267 Nevertheless, the decision may have a "larger
rippling effect."268 Justice Blackmun's refusal to accept the argu-
ments that the loss of confidentiality would destroy peer review, and
that academic freedom mandated a privilege, will most likely prevent
future courts from creating a privilege for private discrimination ac-
tions and other actions such as libel.269 Therefore, even though the
Court did not address discovery requests other than Commission sub-
poenas, it is likely that no privilege will exist in other circumstances
either.
B. Impact on University Tenure Review
The impact of the decision on universities and their tenure proce-
Must Disclose Information in Bias Case, Chron. Higher Educ., Jan. 17, 1990, at Al, col.
2.
263. One commentator noted that "[s]cholars who read and write faculty evalua-
tions know that there's more than one way to say the same thing." Blum, Writers of
Evaluations Know There's More Than One Way to Describe a Colleague's Accomplish-
ments or Lack Thereof, Chron. Higher Educ., Feb. 14, 1990, at A19, Col. 2.
264. Reuben, supra note 260 at 9, col. 1.
265. University of Pa. v. EEOC, 110 S. Ct. 577, 584 (1990).
266. See idl at 583.
267. Lee, The Supreme Court's U. of Pennsylvania Ruling Does Not Sound the
Death Knell for Peer Review, Chron. Higher Educ., Jan. 24, 1990, at Bi, col. 2.
268. Blum, supra note 262, at A17, col. 2 (quoting William W. Van Alstyne, general
counsel for the American Association of University Professors and Professor of law at
Duke University).
269. Id.
dures is equally, if not more, uncertain. Some commentators have
predicted that purging the peer review process of confidentiality will
weaken the process by which universities grant tenure.27 0 The fear is
that evaluators will hesitate to be candid and critical, resulting in
bland and ineffective peer reviews.2 7 1 Moreover, evaluators from
outside the particular university may become unwilling to participate
in the peer review process, especially where a charge of discrimina-
tion is likely to be made.272
Other commentators agree with Justice Blackmun and believe that
the decision will have a minimal effect, if any, on the tenure pro-
cess.27 3 First of all, few tenure decisions are challenged on the basis
of discrimination.274 Secondly, universities generally had difficulty
keeping peer reviews confidential before this decision.2 75 Further-
more, evaluators may become more careful to consider meritorious
criteria without forfeiting candor or criticism,21 6 and universities may
actually begin to treat minorities fairly when making tenure
decisions.
Perhaps the most compelling evidence of a possible impact on uni-
versities comes from those universities that allowed tenure candi-
dates access to their peer reviews before University of
Pennsylvania.277 Many universities that employ an "open system"
are compelled to do so as state universities under state law.278 Never-
theless, those universities claim that openness has not diminished
candor; in fact, it has "boost[ed] morale." 279 However, in smaller uni-
versities, professors who are members of a small, tightly-knit com-
munity might suffer harsher effects from an open system than would
professors in a larger school.28 0
Indeed, the actual impact on universities and the tenure process re-
270. Mooney, supra note 261, at Al, col. 2.
271. Id. at A21, col. 1. One commentator suggests that evaluators be instructed how
to write critiques to prevent the evaluations from being bland and eventually dis-
carded. Blum, supra note 263, at A19, cols. 1 & 2.
272. Professor Van Alstyne admitted that, although his evaluations would remain
candid, he might not participate in the review of women or minorities in certain situa-
tions. Mooney, supra note 261, at A18, col. 4.
273. For a discussion of Justice Blackmun's opinion concerning the impact of dis-
closure, see supra notes 248-250 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
275. Mooney, supra note 261, at A18, col. 3 (quoting Walter Lynn, dean of the
faculty at Cornell University); Comment, supra note 46, at 599.
276. Mooney, supra note 261, at Al, col. 2.
277. The Court noticed that "confidentiality is not the norm in all peer review sys-
tems." University of Pa. v. EEOC, 110 S. Ct. 577, 588 (1990) (citing G. Bednash, The
Relationship Between Access and Selectivity in Tenure Review Outcomes (1989) (un-
published Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Maryland)).
278. See Blum, Universities Where Tenure Candidates Can Review Their Files Say
System Has Not Been Undermined, Chron. Higher Educ., Feb. 14, 1990, at A19, col. 4.
279. Id.
280. See EEOC v. Franklin and Marshall College, 775 F.2d 110, 115 (3d Cir. 1985)
[Vol. 18: 213, 1990] University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
suiting from University of Pennsylvania is difficult to predict, but
the crucial factor may be the way the universities and evaluators re-
act to the decision.28 1 An educational institution might conceivably
suffer a loss of confidence in the tenure process, potentially resulting
in low morale and inferior faculty, if it overreacts to the decision and
abandons peer reviews.28 2 Conversely, individual evaluators may
eliminate any.negative impact to the peer review process by making a
conscious effort to support their conclusions with data to insure a
tenure decision based on merit.28 3
C. Possible Legal Reactions
Any impact of this decision may be eliminated completely through
legislation, as Justice Blackmun2S4 observed, stating that "[i]f [Con-
gress] dislikes the result, it of course may revise the statute."285 Con-
gress can amend Title VII to expressly prohibit the discovery of
confidential peer reviews. In fact, as recognized by Rule 501 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress may create a statutory privilege
protecting academic peer reviews. 288 While the creation of such a
privilege would eliminate the negative impact on universities, it
would decimate both private and Title VII causes of action in dis-
crimination claims and would be contrary to congressional intent.28 7
Even in the absence of a statutory privilege, district courts have the
power to minimize any ill effects suffered by the university, while at
the same time allowing the Commission to pursue discrimination
claims.288 The tool by which courts may accommodate these interests
is Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 26(c) per-
mits a court to grant a protective order denying "in whole or in part"
the discovery of requested material.28 9 This rule allows courts lati-
(court acknowledged that disclosure of peer reviews might especially effect small
schools), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986).
281. See Blum, supra note 263 at A19, cols. 1 & 2 (in light of this decision, evalu-
ators might make "disclaimers and gloss f] over critical opinions").
282. Blum, supra note 278, at A21, col. 1.
283. See Blum, supra note 263, at A19, col. 4.
284. University of Pa. v. EEOC, 110 S. Ct. 577, 585 (1990).
285. Id.
286. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text. Several state legislatures have
created privileges to protect medical peer reviews. Developments, supra note 51, at
1627.
287. Comment, supra note 37, at 1543 ("fixing a university privilege in a federal
statute would undermine the judicial flexibility sought by Congress in adopting rule
501").
288. Id.
289. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
tude to prevent plaintiffs, or the Commission, from discovering cer-
tain portions of the peer review materials that would cause a
university "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden
or expense."290
Under the authority of Rule 26(c), courts may redact identifying
language from peer review files, allowing the evaluators to remain
anonymous.291 Some scholars contend that a protective order is in-
sufficient to protect a university's interest,292 and that it is unclear
whether redaction would effectively preserve confidentiality. Never-
theless, because they have been denied an evidentiary privilege, uni-
versities must consider alternatives which, although not offering
complete protection, might retain sufficient confidentiality to combat
the "chilling effect."29 3
Courts should also be cautious when dealing with university de-
fendants to prevent the holding in University of Pennsylvania from
becoming a precedent for intruding into university autonomy.
Although "[t]he decision sets a tone for government intervention in
university affairs,"294 even Justice Blackmun recognized that courts
should avoid "second-guessing of legitimate academic judgments."295
It may be catastrophic to academia in America if this case were mis-
construed and utilized as a stepping stone toward government intru-
sion into academic decision-making. However, although the case
allows the Commission to fully investigate discrimination claims
against a university, it also requires that tenure decisions based on ac-
ademic grounds should receive extremely cautious judicial review. 296
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has settled the issue of a judicially created aca-
demic freedom privilege and, in so doing, has taken what it believes
to be a step toward eradicating discrimination in the hiring practices
of universities. As long as educational institutions and individual
faculty evaluators respond to the decision with a commitment to rec-
290. 1d&
291. Even though a privilege was denied, the Court did not address whether a uni-
versity may redact certain information from peer review materials. University of Pa.
v. EEOC, 110 S. Ct. 577, 589 n.9 (1990).
292. See Comment, supra note 37, at 1543.
293. Daniel Steiner, vice-president and general counsel at Harvard University said,
"We have to look for alternatives to deal with a situation which might deter totally
candid evaluations. Redaction might help considerably in preserving confidentiality
and the tenure process." Blum, supra note 262, at A17, col. 5.
294. Mooney, supra note 261, at A18, col. 1. (quoting Anne H. Frank, associate sec-
retary and counsel for the AAUP).
295. University of Pa., 110 S. Ct. at 587.
296. Id, Courts reviewing "the substance of a genuinely academic decision ...
should show great respect for the faculty's professional judgment." Id (quoting Re-
gents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985)).
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ommend faculty members for tenure based on merit, University of
Pennsylvania could provide the groundwork on which universities
can be built free from arbitrary discrimination.
However, the Court's decision might also set the tone for excessive
government intrusion into university affairs. The district courts
should be wary of impeding university autonomy without sacrificing
the value of Title VII as a tool against discrimination. The courts
should utilize protective orders to encourage candor in peer reviews
by redacting certain identifying features. These protective orders
would allow universities to continue to employ the peer review pro-
cess and suggest to evaluators that their identities may remain
confidential.
Thus, the battle over disclosure of faculty peer reviews could take
a new form as universities argue that certain material should be re-
dacted, and plaintiffs request that the documents be produced in full.
Hopefully, the district courts will be able to strike a balance so that
both the fight against arbitrary discrimination and an effective ten-
ure system may coexist in the university setting.
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